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In his two chief works, the Theogony and Works and Days, Hesiod treats the possibil-
ity of providence. In the former poem, he considers what sort of god could claim to 
gives human beings guidance. After arriving at Zeus as the only consistent possibil-
ity, Hesiod presents Zeus’ rule as both cosmic and legalistic. In the latter poem, how-
ever, Hesiod shows that so long as Zeus is legalistic, his rule is limited cosmically to the 
human being. Ultimately, Zeus’ rule emerges as more human than cosmic, and thus 
unable to fulfil the cosmic demands of piety. Hesiod’s presentation thus begs, without 
thematically posing, the question of how human beings ought to live. Accordingly, 
Hesiod’s theological analysis, and not his theogony (or, implicit cosmogony or cosmol-
ogy), sets the stage for the inquiries of the early Greek philosophers, and so political 
philosophy as a whole.
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1 Introduction (Theogony 1-115)
Hesiod begins the Theogony with a justification of his ability to speak on 
matters from long ago, from a time without men, indeed from that time when 
the gods first came to be. More precisely, he begins from the Muses and lists the 
gods of whom they sing, and, with the end of that list, remarks that the Muses 
taught him, Hesiod, a lowly shepherd, to sing of such exalted events. The 
necessity of his justification emerges reasonably from the distance Hesiod’s 
audience must notice between their particular existence and the singular, 
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universal moment of which he is to sing. But his audience is unaware that 
Mount Helikon, home of the Muses, is also a haunt of Hesiod and his flock, 
and that there the Muses gave Hesiod not just his song, but the very staff he 
holds before them. Whatever force this relic may have in persuading Hesiod’s 
audience of his ability to sing, they are warned against excessive trust in his 
song by what Hesiod tells us the Muses said:
Rural herders, bad and reproachable ones, but bellies,
we know how to speak many falsehoods like what are (ἐτύμοισιν),
and we know, whenever we want, how to sing true things. (26-8)1
And yet Hesiod’s justification is not thereby deflated, for even if the follow-
ing should contain falsehoods, they nevertheless remain divine falsehoods. At 
least at the outset, then, Hesiod asks his listeners to exercise a cautious piety, 
and thus, if not to discern as far as possible which of the two the Muses have 
elected to do, then at the very least to absorb what they teach with their char-
acter in mind. Now, we are informed that the Muses will
sing the race of gods in celebratory song, first,
from the beginning, those born of Gaia and Ouranos,
and the gods, givers of goods, who came to be from these,
and, second, in turn, Zeus, father of gods and men. (44-7)
1 All citations are to the work of Hesiod indicated in the section heading, unless otherwise 
noted. For the text, I have used F. Solmsen, Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), but have also consulted the more exhaustive collection of fragments 
in R. Merkelbach and M.L. West, Fragmenta Hesiodea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967). For my translations, I am greatly indebted to the following commentaries and transla-
tion: R. Hamilton, Hesiod’s Works and Days (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr Commentaries, 1988); 
Hamilton, Hesiod’s Theogony (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr Commentaries, 1990); R. Lattimore 
(trans.), The Works and Days, Theogony, The Shield of Herakles (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1991); W.J. Verdenius, ‘Hesiod, “Theogony” 507-616: Some Comments on a 
Commentary’, Mnemosyne, 24 (1971), pp. 1-10; Verdenius, ‘Notes on the Proem of Hesiod’s 
“Theogony” ’, Mnemosyne, 25 (1972), pp. 225-60; Verdenius, A Commentary on Hesiod Works 
and Days, vv. 1-382 (Leiden: Brill, 1985); West, Hesiod: Theogony (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1966); West, Hesiod: Works and Days (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); West, The 
Hesiodic Catalogue of Women (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). I also owe a debt of 
gratitude to Prof. Jane Carter of Tulane University for allowing me to attend her course on the 
Theogony and Works and Days.
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The two songs are the two poems that follow: the first gives us the genera-
tions of the gods (cf. 104-115); the second, a hymn to Zeus (cf. Works and Days 
1-10). In the following discussion, our guiding question will be how these lies in 
particular could be like what are real, i.e. why the generation of the gods and 
providence of Zeus could be false, but still like what is. My contention is that in 
the Theogony Hesiod cycles through the respective rules of Ouranos, Kronos, 
and Zeus in order to arrive at the sort of god that could satisfy the demands of 
human piety, and that in the Works and Days he shows why those demands 
render Zeus’ rule impossible. In short, I will argue that Hesiod outlines the best 
possible case for providence, only to show, in the end, its impossibility.
2 Motion, Rest, and Rule (Theogony 116-506)
The Muses begin not with Gaia and Ouranos, as Hesiod twice anticipated (45, 
106), but rather an unannounced god, Chaos. He is one of the four original gods, 
the other three being Gaia, Tartaros, and Eros. Gaia’s birth is accompanied by a 
reference to the eventual order of which she is the secure seat, while Tartaros is 
put in the plural as Tartara, and labelled simply ‘murky’. Chaos, in turn, means 
‘gap’, while Eros’ beauty induces the self-forgetting to be expected of the regard 
of another, so characteristic of love. With the first four gods, the Muses give 
us order and disorder, along with conjunction and disjunction. The four thus 
prove necessary to one another and, in being both disjoined as many and con-
joined into one, self-referential. The necessity of each for the others is prob-
lematic, however, for Hesiod has them come into being separately: if Chaos 
cannot be what it is without the others, then how can the Muses begin ‘first 
Chaos came to be, then thereafter’ (116)? Before the Muses can even get to the 
γένεσις of the gods qua birth or generation, they present us with a riddle about 
the γένεσις of the gods qua coming-into-being.2 The Muses’ song necessitates 
this problem: they must sing to human beings how the world as it is came 
to be, speaking of each part outside of its present context, while still under-
standing it in light of its present context.3 To do otherwise would be to sing 
2 For an illuminating account of this difficulty, see M. Miller, ‘The Implicit Logic of Hesiod’s 
Cosmogony: An Examination of Theogony, 116-133’, Independent Journal of Philosophy, 4 
(1982), pp. 131-42.
3 For a discussion of the difference between giving an account of something in terms of how it 
came to be and in terms of what it is, see S. Benardete, Encounters and Reflections (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 154-5. He refers to these two accounts as genetic and 
eidetic, respectively, and discusses, albeit briefly, how they are related.
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truths like falsehoods. Accordingly, Hesiod’s account will, as we will see, have 
the mark of the human being on it from start to finish.4 At present, we see that 
even Hesiod’s monsters are monstrous in human terms: the Cyclopes Brontes, 
Steropes, and Arges paradoxically have μοῦνος ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν μέσσῳ μετώπῳ, while 
Kottos, Briareos, and Gyges are great in form because they have fifty heads and 
a hundred hands. From the beginning of the Muses’ song, we are confronted 
with the difficulty of putting together motion and rest: how can we describe 
the past in terms of the present, the strange in terms of the familiar? That is, 
can a static understanding of something adequately account for phenomena 
prior to those phenomena on which that static understanding is based? As 
the Theogony progresses, the Muses will present various attempts to reconcile 
motion and rest through the rule of this or that god, ultimately demonstrating 
that such a resolution is possible only through the rule of a god like Zeus. In 
the present section of the paper, we will see that Hesiod argues that Zeus is 
such a sort of god. Only thereafter will we turn to how the character of Zeus’ 
rule directly addresses, though not to say makes good on, the demands of piety.
The rule of Ouranos is the first attempt at such a reconciliation, in particular 
through a simple denial of change and generation. The appeal of such a rec-
onciliation lies in ‘starry’ (ἀστερόεις) Ouranos’ serving as a trustworthy guide 
throughout the year, with the various constellations signaling when we should 
do what with the earth; absurdly, however, such a reconciliation would deny 
the generative process by which the variety seen in Ouranos, which guides our 
work, and found on Gaia, on whom we work, came to be, and which must have 
come to be after Gaia and Ouranos. Accordingly, Ouranos maintains his rule by 
using his phallus to block Gaia’s birth canal, i.e. by employing his organ of gen-
eration against generation, which is both his cause, as offspring of Gaia, and 
effect, as mate of Gaia and father of her children (cf. 126-7). Gaia must there-
fore solicit her children to depose their father, and only Kronos, ‘Time’, steps 
forward. Kronos usurps his father’s rule by means of a farmer’s sickle, which 
Gaia readies for him from a race (γένος) of metal that she makes. If the appeal 
of the rule of Ouranos was in the guidance of the stars, the appeal of Kronos’ 
rule is in the guidance of the sickle, by which the farmer, in his work, appro-
priates the fruits of the earth. The farmer’s activity of fashioning implements 
and reaping fruits thus attains the level of a divine principle, with the realm of 
human action identical to the ascendancy of Kronos, inasmuch as both stand 
for the corrective promotion of reproduction: Gaia’s activity blurs γένεσις, 
‘generation’, and ποίησις, ‘making’ (161: ποιήσασα γένος). And yet Kronos’ cor-
rection of Ouranos is preceded by Gaia’s self-correction, her blurring of γένεσις 
4 Cf. n. 34.
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and ποίησις in the making of the race of metal corrected by her fashioning of 
the metal into a sickle. Likewise, Aphrodite, born from the severed genitals 
of Ouranos, is not fertility simply, but the persistence of fertility in spite of the 
reaping of fruits. That is, in Gaia’s self-correction and Aphrodite’s birth from 
Ouranos’ apparently neutered genitals, we already see the grounds for ques-
tioning the rule of Kronos: human making, as corrective, is corrective of gen-
eration, which persists not because of making, but rather in spite of it. Motion 
and rest still remain in tension.
The Theogony fittingly presents the rule of Kronos as a long series of gen-
erations: the rule of Kronos, ‘Time’, restores what the rule of Ouranos for-
bade, generation. Kronos’ rule begins with the generations of Nux, whose 
eventual offspring include Pseudea, ‘Falsity’, and her ilk, and ends with Zeus’ 
birth through the deception of Kronos. Gaia’s substitution of a swaddled rock 
for Zeus becomes thematic in Zeus’ rule, which is characterized by a series 
of deceptions.5 At present, the defect of Kronos’ rule that the ascendancy of 
Zeus is meant to correct seems to lie in its inability to comprehend falsehood, 
despite the fact that his rule emerges as a correction, i.e. as truer to life than 
that of Ouranos. Reading on, we first notice the earlier hint at a flaw in Kronos’ 
rule when, just after the birth of the Gorgons, we are told Perseus beheaded 
Medousa, from whose neck Chrusaor and Pegasos leapt out. The first human 
action since the Muses began their song echoes Kronos’ emasculation of 
Ouranos and the birth of Aphrodite. The tension within Kronos’ rule – in his 
interruption of generation for the sake of generation – is translated into a ten-
sion between the interruption of generation through human action, on the 
one hand, and Kronos’ rule as the priority of generation and time, on the other: 
Gaia’s sickle is put back in human hands where it belongs. This tension becomes 
thematic as the generations continue: just after Chrusaor and Kallirhoe bear 
Geryon, we learn that Heraclean power stripped Geryon down, along with 
Orthos and Eurytion; only after this episode do we learn that Kallirhoe bore 
Echidna, who with Typhaon, they say (φασι), bore Orthos (Geryon’s dog), 
Kerberos, and Hydra; we then learn that Hera, angry with Heraclean power, 
armed Hydra, whom Heracles nevertheless killed, by the will of Athena; no 
sooner is Chimaira born than we learn that Pegasus and Bellerophontes killed 
5 Paraphrasing J.-P. Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table: Hesiod’s Foundation Myth of Sacrifice’, in 
M. Detienne and Vernant (eds.), The Cuisine of Sacrifice Among the Greeks (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 21-86, J. Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003), pp. 101-2 provides a helpful outline of the repeated narrative elements. 
We must add, however, that the series of deceptions begins with Hesiod’s suggestion that the 
entirety of his song may be ψεύδεα ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα (27).
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her; and, finally, the Nemeian lion, sent by Hera, succumbs to Heraclean power. 
The rule of Kronos, i.e. the primacy of generation, appears to mean that there is 
an immortal source of miseries that come and go, against which human beings 
contend and over which they hope to prove victorious. When and from where 
our miseries arise remains uncertain, and this much is Kronian. Yet whatever 
god will relieve us must disrupt the Kronian stream of generation, must pos-
sess a rule different from that of Kronos. The uncertainty in our fate, in the 
success of our efforts to bring about the wanted outcomes, will be accounted 
for only through the rule of Zeus.
The rule of Ouranos had its appeal for the farmer in the guidance of the 
stars and its absurdity in its denial of the process of generation by which that 
variety comes to be. The rule of Kronos corrected that of Ouranos, but only by 
producing a correlative difficulty: the very variety that makes starry Ouranos a 
trusty guide also makes our fate uncertain. After listing the Okeanids at length, 
Hesiod says it would be vexing to go through all of them, though the locals 
know their names.6 Yet in the sequel he quickly accounts for the celestial bod-
ies and the winds that guide human life. Around us we find ineffable contin-
gency, above us formal consistency. We look upwards to the latter for guidance 
only because we are confronted with the unpredictability of the former: while 
a man’s miseries are not likely to be from something as grand as the Nemeian 
lion, something as small as an underfed dog on a poor farm can lead to ruin 
(cf. Works and Days 604-5). Accordingly, we pray to the gods for help, and a 
god could only answer our prayers if he interrupted the unpredictable flux and 
guarded us against the evils it brings. Hesiod thus rewards Hekate, the god-
dess through whom our prayers are fulfilled, with a hymn, and quite abruptly.7 
6 Cf. West, Hesiod: Theogony, p. 260: ‘Their importance as individuals is very unequal. Most 
of them have none, and may have been invented ad hoc; some may have been the names of 
actual springs, though we miss those most famous in myth . . . A few . . . reflect properties 
of their father . . . Others have no essential connexion with water at all, but are names appro-
priate to fairy godmothers . . . [W]e find dropped apparently at random in the list such signifi-
cant but not eminently fontane goddesses as Peitho, Metis, Tyche – names which Hesiod can 
hardly have hit upon by chance, unaware of their meaning for others. He must have worked 
them in deliberately, but preferred not to interrupt the flow of names by annotations on 
individuals.’
7 The movement of the song from the heroes, to Hekate, to the deception of Kronos, and to 
Prometheus vs. Zeus necessitates the displacement of the generation of Iapetonians from 
their chronologically proper place to their thematically proper place. That is, to place them 
in the order of generation would be to ignore their proper place in the understanding 
(cf. n. 3). This approach seems to guide all of Hesiod’s famously problematic chronologies 
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Because Hekate is honoured with having a lot of earth, sea, and sky, mortals 
pray to her to favour them with her power (416-20: δύναμίς γε πάρεστιν). Her 
pervasive, indeed cosmic power means our good and bad fortune is entirely 
dependent on her will, on what she should wish (ἐθέλω: 429, 430, 432, 439, 
443, 446; cf. 28). Hekate thus stands as the goddess that mediates between 
our will and the cosmos, her will effectively determining the extent of confor-
mity between the two.8 Hesiod notes that Zeus’ ascendancy to the throne did 
not diminish her power, so that his rule is apparently entirely in conformity 
with her will. Zeus is not for this reason superfluous, however, for if Hekate 
seems wilful or even capricious, Zeus rules both justly and through mind 
(cf. Works and Days 105, 276-85). Zeus’ rule is thus predicated on the assurance 
that Hekate’s will conforms with justice, that the outcomes of contests, even 
wars, are governed by justice and mind, even when these outcomes do not 
accord with our will.9 Whether or not Zeus’ assurance can be fulfilled is the 
question that Hesiod will eventually have to face and, in the Works and Days, 
will finally answer.
The centrality of will bodes ill for Kronos, whose rule now comes to an 
end. The deception of Kronos, which allows for Zeus’ birth, is much more 
complicated than Kronos’ emasculation of Ouranos. This is because Gaia and 
Ouranos have informed Kronos that his son will eventually usurp him, so that 
Kronos hatches a plan of his own. As Rheia births each child, Kronos waits 
between her knees, eating each as it leaves her birth canal. His plan initially 
appears in line with his rule, essentially imitating the continuous coming into 
being and subsequent passing away characteristic of the primacy of genera-
tion and time. Absurdly, however, Kronos’ rule negates the very coming into 
being it seeks to affirm, inasmuch as it is meant to prevent the birth of his 
son. Ouranos’ attempt to affirm rest employed his means of generation, while 
Kronos’ attempt to affirm generation negates the generation of any form of 
in the Theogony. As Benardete quips, ‘the maker does not have to proceed in order in order 
for the whole to be in order’ in ‘The First Crisis in First Philosophy’, in Benardete (author) 
and R. Burger and M. Davis (eds.), The Argument of the Action (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), pp. 3-14, p. 5. Cf. Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos, p. 14.
8 As others have noted, the name Ἑκάτη seems to be a pun on ἕκητι. Cf. Benardete, ‘First Crisis’, 
p. 14 n. 1; Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos, pp. 135-6.
9 The threefold allotment of Hekate – of earth, sea, and sky – has its political counterpart in the 
first three sons of Rheia – Hades, Poseidon, and Zeus – with Zeus having general domain over 
all three (cf. 453-8). During the Titanomachy and the battle with Typhoeus, Zeus will prove 
the reach of his power through these three realms, while nevertheless dividing them among 
his brothers.
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rest. Making the inverse mistake of his father, Kronos forms a half-baked plan 
that simply rushes straight from birth to perishing, so as to maintain or render 
static the status quo. As Kronos’ example shows, forethought is the attempt to 
alter the stream of generation so as to avoid a change for the worse or to bring 
about a change for the better, and is thus premised on the desirability, though 
not to say feasibility, of an entirely good state. Resting in such a state would 
seem to be the ultimate desideratum. Forethought thus posits a separate 
course of γένεσις in place of its present course, in accordance with this desire 
for a final, resting, good state. Kronos’ forethought is so weak that the sepa-
rate course he effects differs only in duration. He cannot even look past his 
nose to the swaddled rock in place of his son. Kronos must cede power to Zeus, 
who blends motion and rest into an order that persists through time. Ruling 
through will and mind, Zeus is the first god of the Theogony that appears to fit 
the human being’s attempt to harness the advantages and avert the disadvan-
tages of becoming by means of access to a persisting order. Hesiod must, in 
turn, detail the character of the specific mode of access chosen, namely piety, 
in the remainder of the Theogony, before examining the possibility of its satis-
faction in the Works and Days.
3 Zeus and the Human Condition (Theogony 507-616)
A mixture of rest and motion pervades Zeus’ rule from the beginning. Right 
after Atlas, Menoitios, Prometheus, and Epimetheus are born, we are told of 
how Zeus changed their fates. Atlas and Menoitios’ stories are dispatched 
quickly enough, and Epimetheus’, taken on its own, no less. But Prometheus’ 
fate prompts a long discussion, for Zeus is the agent of both his punishment 
and his subsequent release. Zeus’ reversal of a punishment as harsh as the 
one he gave Prometheus is explained in the passing statement that, ‘even 
though he was angry, he ceased from the anger he earlier had’ (533).10 Zeus’ 
anger runs the risk of seeming either capricious, and hence unjust, or entirely 
subordinated to his mind. Paradoxical as the latter sounds, this seems to be 
the case, for Zeus, well aware that Prometheus intends to deceive him, still 
grows angry upon allowing the deception to occur. Taking a digression from 
his chronicling of Zeus’ ascendancy to power, Hesiod spends the next hundred 
10 The Greek here is especially intriguing: καί περ χωόμενος παύθη χόλου ὃν πρὶν ἔχεσκεν. 
Zeus goes from being angry to possessing anger. While certainly unaware of anything like 
the term ontology, Hesiod seems nevertheless to have put his finger on the ontological 
assumptions of Zeus’ rational anger.
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or so lines detailing the paradoxical relationship of Zeus’ mind to his anger. 
The digression is not, however, merely a sideshow, but rather proves essential 
to demonstrating that Zeus is, in fact, a god that addresses the demands of 
piety. That is, his paradoxical mixture of anger and mind is, as we will see, a 
function of his particular mixture of motion and rest.
The crime for which Zeus punishes Prometheus is a deception, in which the 
Iapetonian places the choicest parts of an ox – the meat and innards, rich in 
fat – in the bland and unappetizing hide and stomach, while placing the use-
less, white bones – white, presumably, because stripped of meat and fat – in an 
attractive layer of shining fat. Zeus knowingly chooses the deceptive bundle, 
and decides, in his anger, not to give man fire. Prometheus, in turn, smuggles 
all-useful fire in a benign fennel stalk, and so provokes Zeus not simply to with-
hold a good from man, but to provide him an evil. The first story explains the 
human practice of supplicating the gods, specifically as regards the practice 
of burning bones to them, the second the origin of the almost superhumanly 
powerful arts in the theft of divine fire. The two stories would seem to find 
their best expression in Hesiod’s dual exhortations to his brother to obey Zeus 
by being just and to work in Works and Days 202-341. Where a means to the 
good beyond that of just work proves necessary, Zeus’ anger dissuades us from 
the route of injustice, while his divine forethought assures us of the route of 
piety. A just man looks outside himself and seeks in Zeus the cosmic correc-
tion of his condition. The burning of bones is not just a sign of piety, then, but 
an expression of the frustration of man’s will that the fiery arts cannot make 
sustenance of hard and heavy bone.11 Man’s will extends beyond himself and 
requires that Zeus be the cosmic punisher and provider, a combination of anger 
and the furthest forethought. Lest his moments of apparent vacillation, as with 
Prometheus, reduce his justice to mere caprice, and so reduce him to Hekate, 
Zeus’ mind must not only be comprehensive, but incomprehensible, and his 
anger entirely subordinate: ‘he grew angry around [his] mind, and anger came 
to his heart’ (554; cf. 613). Paradoxically, Zeus’ anger overcomes him, and yet 
doesn’t overcome him, since he can start or stop it as is reasonable. But para-
doxical as Zeus’ rational anger may be, only thus can he satisfy the demands 
11 The crimes of offering bones and stealing fire are not just those of Prometheus, 
‘Forethought’, but of all forethought, including that serving man’s exercise of his will. Zeus 
was just, then, to punish man for Prometheus’ crimes.
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of human piety.12 His rational anger appears all-too-human in the question it 
purports to answer.13
Zeus’ punishment for the theft of fire illuminates the extent to which the 
burning of bones constitutes an extension of technical mastery from the cos-
mos itself to the immortal gods who govern that cosmos. Zeus sends the beau-
tiful evil (καλὸν κακὸν) of woman to man. Hesiod diligently catalogues just why 
woman is evil, using the famous, or infamous, image of a beehive. Just as hard-
working honeybees work all day in the sun to supply honey to feed the drones, 
who laze about in the hive, so too do women reap the fruits of men’s labour 
while remaining at home.14 Hesiod explains what good the beauty of such 
a wife might promise over the evil of her parasitic behaviour in the sequel, 
where he discusses the apparent evil that awaits those who select the good of 
permanent bachelorhood. The apparent evil awaiting the bachelor is twofold: 
that of having no caretaker for one’s old age and that of having distant inheri-
tors divide up one’s livelihood. Both are owed to a lack of children. Why the 
second evil is an evil is difficult to understand, since one is by that time already 
dead. And since a man of sufficient means could presumably hire someone as 
a caretaker, the first evil seems to be that it is a living reminder of the second, 
namely that upon death one’s livelihood is scattered. The evil can only be said 
12 Vernant proposes the following interpretation of this passage: ‘if we must state that 
Zeus foresaw everything, we must immediately add that according to this foresight, 
Prometheus would take the initiative to compete with him, that he would succeed in 
tricking him, that the king of the gods would be furious about it, and that he would bring 
about men’s unhappiness, not directly but by means of the very advantages that their 
defender would have gained against him’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, p. 225 n. 6). Pointing 
out that Hesiod says that events before Zeus’ birth will unfold through Zeus’ will, Vernant 
concludes ‘events will unfold according to the plans of Zeus . . . even before Zeus . . . could 
have thought of these plans’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, p. 225 n. 6). Vernant’s interpretation 
seems to me an elegant statement of the consequences of the paradox of Zeus’ rational 
anger: as rational, Zeus is predictive; as angry, he is reactive.
13 ‘Before Styx, we are in the realm of desire; after Styx and up to and through the 
Titanomachy and the defeat of Typhos, we are in the realm of the will; and after Zeus is 
completely in charge, there is the realm of the mind. It does not have to be stressed how 
curiously similar this is to the soul-structure of Plato’s Republic; but it may be as deceptive 
as Plato’s scheme’ (Benardete, ‘First Crisis’, p. 12). Cf. R. Burger, ‘The Thumotic and Erotic 
Soul: Seth Benardete on Platonic Psychology’, Interpretation, 32 (2004), pp. 57-76.
14 The accusation of misogyny against Hesiod appears to me poorly founded. Hesiod uses the 
same image and language with respect to men in Works and Days 303-6. Hesiod’s point 
is that human vice manifests itself differently in men and women, consistent with their 
different roles as provider of sustenance and bearer of children. Cf. μελιηδέα in Works and 
Days 172. 
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to visit one in death because life is spent accruing a livelihood, which persists 
beyond death. Conversely, the good that Zeus’ beautiful evil promises is some 
measure of life after death, in the persistence of ‘oneself ’ inasmuch as one’s 
livelihood remains with one’s offspring.15 The evil of woman, in turn, is that she 
cannot work and yet must consume that livelihood (cf. Works and Days 405-6).16 
Man’s sole means for overcoming his mortality, to the extent that it is possible, 
is also an impediment. Such is the depth of Zeus’ mind, that
wonder (θαῦμα) held both the immortal gods and mortal human beings, 
as they looked upon the high deceit, unmanageable for human 
beings. (588-9)
The deceit speaks to a desire in man to overcome his mortality as far as pos-
sible, a desire whose most complete satisfaction would be found in apotheosis. 
Seeing in the theft of the fiery arts and the burning of the bones a desire to 
become a god, Zeus tempts man with woman, with the promise of the faint 
glimmer of immortality that can be gleaned from bequeathing one’s substance 
to one’s offspring.17
Because the sole apparent means to immortality is also a threat to the same, 
it cannot be received but as a punishment. The good of overcoming one’s mor-
tality is had only through obedience to the justice of the beautiful evil Zeus 
sent to man. Born mortal into scarcity, man finds himself caught in a complex 
interchange of just and beautiful evils that promise him his good in due time. 
Zeus the punisher and the provider, whose rule extends to every corner of the 
cosmos, is the sort of god whose rule addresses the problematic entanglement 
of ends – of beautiful evils, just evils, and the good – in which man finds him-
self. Zeus’ blend of motion and rest requires that his withholding be a punish-
ment, and thus stem from anger, but also that it be rational, for the static order 
15 Cf. Genesis 15:5, 28:13-14, 22:17, Exodus 32:13-14.
16 Hesiod has this same thought in mind when he remarks, ‘a singly-born son would be 
nurturing for the fatherly household’ (Works and Days 376-7).
17 Hesiod alludes to the connection between the desire to reproduce and the desire for 
apotheosis when he counts among the benefits of the just city that ‘women bear children 
like [their] forebears’ (Works and Days 235). While we might initially take this only to mark 
the absence of adultery, it might also be a comment on the desire to see one’s physical 
likeness in one’s offspring, so that by leaving your livelihood to one who resembles you, 
you are under the impression that you have evaded death. Hesiod thus counts among the 
evils visiting the iron generation in its decline that ‘neither [will] father [be] like [his] 
children, nor the children in any way [like their father]’ (Works and Days 182). For Hesiod’s 
audience, it is lamentable even if the child resembles his mother.
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does not always give us what we want from the change in the world around 
us. Having arrived at a god that claims to meet the demands of human piety, 
Hesiod can continue his story of Zeus’ ascent to power, and display thereby the 
character of his cosmic rule. In this way, Hesiod will complete the Theogony’s 
top-down picture of human life and so be ready to continue on to the bottom-
up picture of the Works and Days.
4 The Fundamental Character of Zeus’ Rule (Theogony 617-880)
Hesiod continues with the Titanomachy, which he includes not for thorough-
ness, but to illustrate the character and prowess of Zeus’ rule. Hesiod begins 
in media res with Zeus’ freeing, on Gaia’s suggestion, of the hundred-handers 
Briareos, Kottos, and Gyges to help him defeat the Titans. We learn why this is 
necessary after the fact: ten years of battle have led to no gain on either side, 
and with no resolution, either. Once freed, Zeus treats them to the gods’ food 
of nectar and ambrosia, after which he requests their help, firmly (650: φαίνετε; 
cf. 689), though courteously. To persuade the brothers, Zeus cites his love and 
the plotting that brought them from their suffering bonds in the misty dark-
ness up into the light. Kottos’ reply indicates his reverence, if not awe, before 
Zeus’ cunning, though he makes no mention of his love – ten years have 
gone by, after all (656, 658; cf. 655: δαιμόνι[ε]). They seem, however, to under-
estimate the extent of Zeus’ cunning. On the heels of this episode, the battle 
resumes, the din reaching deep into Tartaros. But Zeus – apparently restrain-
ing himself until now (687-9) – and his fire extend still further, and this, we are 
told, is what turns the battle (711). We wonder whether the hundred-handers 
were in fact necessary for victory. They are nevertheless granted the honour 
of defeating their earlier captors, and given the task of guarding them deep 
under the earth. That the newly released brothers are dispatched without any 
apparent incident back under the earth, from where they’ve just been released, 
is initially puzzling, until one notices that while Kottos bemoaned being kept 
beneath the earth, he made no mention of being brought into the light, as 
did both Zeus and Hesiod (cf. 626, 652, 669). By giving the hundred-handers 
the honour of defeating their captor brothers and showing everyone the reach 
of his fire, Zeus effectively prevents their later collusion, while keeping all of 
them out of sight, and thus out of mind. Such may have been the substance 
of Gaia’s premonition, that with them is victory won. At the very least, such 
is the extent of Zeus’ political skill. That is, the security of Zeus’ rule turns on 
this brief episode in the ascendancy of Zeus: while Hesiod devotes nearly a 
hundred lines to the Titanomachy, he bypasses the Gigantomachy altogether; 
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again, though Hesiod discusses at length the importance and effect of free-
ing the hundred-handers, he speaks only briefly of the parallel freeing of the 
Cyclopes, through whom Zeus obtains his famous weapons (501-6). These tex-
tual cues indicate that in this particular battle and in this particular freeing is 
Zeus’ political acumen most manifest. Nevertheless, the fundamental charac-
ter of Zeus’ rule emerges only after the three episodes related in the present 
passage: the Titanomachy, the description of Tartaros, and the birth and defeat 
of Typhoeus. In these passages, Hesiod will show how the demands of human 
piety determine the character of Zeus’ rule.
The character of his rule begins to emerge once we recall, as the repeti-
tion of 150-2 at 671-3 invites, that the passage in which the hundred-handers 
were introduced illustrated how the human being understands the mon-
strous in human terms. Zeus now assimilates the monstrous through a process 
of reconciliation and delegation: Briareos and his brothers are immediately 
dispatched from where they came, but with an apparently higher station 
(815-9).18 Likewise, murky Tartara is ordered into Tartaros under Zeus’ rule in 
the most articulate and vivid description in the entire Theogony. Save the flow-
ing together of all waters into this source, Tartaros’ articulation and role is at 
every point a product of Zeus’ rule (cf. 729-30, 732-3, 746-7 with 517-20, 767-74, 
775-806 with 383-403). Yet this does not mean that Tartartos is entirely tamed, 
for Hesiod’s description reminds us of the unpredictability of the storms on 
the sea and of the ordered way in which sleep and death come to man. These 
features, along with the interchange of night and day here described, will play 
an integral role in Hesiod’s more practical advice in the Works and Days. Our 
comment on his advice will touch upon this theme in due time. At present, 
however, let it suffice to indicate that the overt claim is that what is guided by 
Zeus’ mind appears unpredictable to man because it is comprehensive, and 
hence incomprehensible. For the same reason that we are unable on our own 
to make our way predictably through the cosmos is Zeus’ intention thoroughly 
beyond our access. Whether this claim can hold up under the actualization of 
Zeus’ rule is the task of our discussion of Works and Days 342-764.
In the Theogony, however, the description of Tartaros prepares us for Zeus’ 
battle with Typhoeus, whom Tartaros sires by Gaia. The battle with Typhoeus 
discloses the fundamental character of Zeus’ rule, which in the Titanomachy 
Hesiod presented as assimilating the monstrous. Now, the silence about this 
18 ‘The information that [Briareos, Kottos, and Gyges] have returned to the lower world is 
conveyed much more naturally and acceptably [in 815-9] than [in 734-5], where we come 
upon them with the surprise we might feel at the zoo if we passed the lions and then 
found their hunters in the next cage’ (West, Hesiod: Theogony, p. 358).
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battle, but not the Titanomachy, in the sequel, as well as the similarity of the 
former to the latter, has led some to suspect the present passage to be an inter-
polated imitation.19 Authors, however, often cast new themes in old contexts 
for the purpose of illustrating how the former is implicit in the latter. And such 
appears to be the case at present. Typhoeus arrives from and is dismissed to 
the same place, Gaia and Tartaros (cf. 820-2, 867-8). His description accords 
with his parentage, an earthly and thus ordered manifestation of a murky and 
thus indeterminate plurality. Aside from a brief note on Typhoeus’ extremities, 
Hesiod spends the entirety of his description on the heads and voices of the 
monster in a highly repetitive passage that denotes less the limits of Hesiod’s 
poetic abilities, as some have surmised,20 but more the disordered variabil-
ity necessary to an earthly manifestation of Typhoeus’ father. Precisely these 
heads, with their fire and voices, must Zeus destroy with his fire to cripple 
the monster.21 In the Titanomachy, Zeus elicited the help of the monstrous 
in the defeat of the monstrous, uniting with the hundred-handers against the 
Titans. Ultimately, however, Zeus’ power is what turned the battle, the mon-
strosity of that power concealed by his political subtlety.22 With Typhoeus, 
Zeus goes it alone and therefore cannot conceal his monstrosity.23 Zeus cau-
terizes Typhoeus and Gaia, disorder and the earthly source of generation, to 
bring order and stability to the world, but can only do so by turning the power 
of fire against itself.24 While one can fight fire with fire, Zeus paradoxically 
extinguishes fire with fire, achieves civility through brutality. Because Zeus 
rose to power, he had to impose order on the disorder, so as to nullify for once 
the unpredictable source of evils that plague human life. The will’s expression 
in piety demands that the cosmos be just and regular, ruled by the mind of 
Zeus rather than the whim of Hekate. But can the disorder ultimately be kept 
19 Cf. West, Hesiod: Theogony, pp. 381-3.
20 Cf. West, Hesiod: Theogony, pp. 381-3.
21 ‘As [Gaia’s] last offspring, Typhoeus is acosmia incarnate, with his puppy-dog yelps, his 
bullish bellows, and his fire-breathing eyes, an embodiment of the total disorder that 
threatens to dismantle the articulated cosmos through universal conflagration’ (Clay, 
Hesiod’s Cosmos, p. 26).
22 Hesiod seems to be Zeus’ henchman in this task, not only here, but elsewhere. Cf. 
Benardete, ‘First Crisis’, p. 6.
23 836-8 echo a theme found in other variations of the Typhoeus story, namely the equality 
of his power to that of Zeus. Cf. West, Hesiod: Theogony, p. 380, sources (b) and (c).
24 Hesiod uses two unique phrases to indicate the reach of Zeus’ power into Tartaros, the 
first of which, τάρταρα γαίης (841), recalls the introduction of Tartaros, while the second of 
which, Τιτῆνές θ᾽ ὑποταρτάριοι (851), recalls the culmination of the immediately preceding 
episode.
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at bay? Can Zeus make good on his promise to reward the just with the good 
and punish the unjust with evil? Or is Zeus, the god of human piety, in fact 
all-too-human, and is his will no less limited than that of man in its cosmic 
efficacy? That with Typhoeus’ defeat come the evil winds that make so much 
trouble for men, both at sea and on land, leads us to the provisional suspicion 
that there will indeed be a limit to Zeus’ rule. As we move from the Theogony 
to the Works and Days, and thus from the most exalted of topics to the most 
mundane, Hesiod will examine whether we can detect Zeus’ presence even in 
the apparently most insignificant of phenomena.
5 Transition (Theogony 881-1022, Catalogue of Women Fragments)
At this point, the manuscripts begin to trail off into what appears to be the now 
lost Catalogue of Women, or at least an introduction to it. Rather than embark 
on so ambitious an endeavour as a reconstruction of the Catalogue of Women 
out of the tatters that remain, we do well to keep in mind the wide variety 
of styles at Hesiod’s command, as well as his ability to surprise us with his 
subtlety of expression and novel narrative structures. Such an appraisal should 
temper our ambition to fill in the blanks of so sublime an author. Rather, 
let us exercise caution and lay out only those parts or features of the text 
of which we can be certain. From this we will at least see how the Catalogue of 
Women effects a transition from the Theogony to the Works and Days. First, 
the Catalogue of Women chronicles the generations of demigods, who at that 
time dwelled and dined with the gods, but whom Zeus eventually destroyed 
(frr. 1, 204.96-100). In this, we discern an echo of the Theogony’s theme of Zeus’ 
incomprehensible mind (fr. 204.96: μήδετο, 204.99: πρ[ό]φασιν; cf. Cypria fr. 1).25 
Second, we learn of those demigods, after whom the various cities and regions 
of Hesiod’s audience are named.26 Again, we recall from the Theogony Hesiod’s 
connection between the local and the divine, the contingent and the universal. 
Third, we find the theme of marital exchange, in which female beauty is won 
with gifts from the suitor(s), culminating in the contest for Helen toward the 
25 Hesiod also seems to indicate that the Theogony and Works and Days frame the Epic 
Cycle, his work thus travelling further back into the past and further forward into the 
present than that of Homer. Whereas Homer seems content to dwell in the past, with 
only occasional allusion to the beginning (e.g. Iliad 14.201) and to the present (e.g. Iliad 
5.304), Hesiod ventures there out of some urgency, either on his part or on the part of his 
audience.
26 Cf. West, The Hesiodic Catalogue, ch. 3.
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end of the Catalogue of Women.27 We notice again a recapitulation, but on a 
much grander scale, of an element familiar from the Theogony, specifically in 
the story of the beautiful evil of woman that Zeus sent man: the exchange of 
livelihood for the sake of a wife. This theme especially appears to tie together 
the whole of the Catalogue of Women, which begins with Pandora and ends 
with Helen, the two exemplars of the ‘beautiful evil’ of woman (frr. 2, 5, 196 ff.). 
The Catalogue of Women thus turns from the universal ancestry of man, in the 
primordial generations related in the Theogony, to the more localized, yet still 
divine ancestry of the current tribes and cities in Greece.28 Despite dwelling 
with the gods, the race of demigods was nevertheless mortal, and thus still 
exhibited the same yearning to overcome their mortality that we found driving 
the marriage dilemma in the Theogony. The Catalogue of Women thus enno-
bles Hesiod’s audience, in locating in the names of the cities and regions they 
inhabit their divine ancestries, while humbling them, in showing the awesome, 
even monstrous, deeds of which their ancestors were capable, and against 
which Zeus voiced his disapproval by initiating their destruction through the 
Trojan War.29 By simultaneously joining us to and separating us from our semi-
divine ancestors, the Catalogue of Women prepares the way for the humble and 
local, as opposed to the heroic and universal, piety that is the secure seat of 
justice – and thus for the Works and Days.
27 Cf. R. Osborne, ‘Ordering Women in Hesiod’s Catalogue’, in R. Hunter (ed.), The Hesiodic 
Catalogue of Women: Constructions and Reconstructions (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 2005), pp. 5-24, pp. 10-14, 17-18.
28 The importance of this shift must be stressed. Zeus withdraws. His providence is thus less 
manifest than in prior ages. The end of the age of heroes means the end of reproduction 
between gods and men, of the behaviour typical of the Homeric gods. In this way, Zeus’ 
rule becomes less human and more cosmic in character. He moves closer to a divine, 
intelligent principle guiding the cosmos, and thus to the object of the first philosophers’ 
inquiries. Cf. Heraclitus DK 57, 41, 32 with Works and Days 267-81.
29 Heracles’ apotheosis would therefore constitute the exceptional bridging of the mortal 
and immortal. But the Heracles of the Theogony, of whose valorous victories over the 
monstrous we variably learn, is not that of the Catalogue of Women, where he justly earns 
the name ‘sacker of cities’ (frr. 25.23: Ἡ[ρακλῆϊ πτολιπό]ρθωι, 229.17: Ἡρ]ακλῆϊ πτολι[πόρθωι; 
cf. frr. 26, 33-5, 43a [esp. 61-2 with 65]). In the Heracles of the Catalogue of Women, we 
seem to see how man’s yearning to overcome his mortality is not simply a destruction of 
the monstrous in the realm of the human, but rather the monstrous destruction of the 
human. For an interesting analysis, to which I am indebted, see Haubold, ‘Heracles in 
the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women’, in Hunter (ed.), The Hesiodic Catalogue, pp. 85-98.
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6 Three Myths (Works and Days 1-201)
In the Works and Days, the Muses will fulfill Hesiod’s request, of which he now 
reminds them, to sing of Zeus (cf. Theogony 47). To sing of Zeus is to sing of 
his will, through which men are or are not renowned, inasmuch as it strength-
ens or weakens, makes conspicuous or invisible, straightens or withers them. 
Hesiod splits duties with Zeus by asking him to straighten the lawful things 
(θέμιστας), while he, in turn, relates what is (ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην) to his brother, 
Perses. Hesiod’s task could very well conflict with Zeus’, if the Muses’ song of 
the ascendancy and rule of Zeus in the Theogony and Works and Days proves 
to be lies like what is (ψεύδεα . . . ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). The potential conflict can be 
phrased in terms of Hesiod’s revision or clarification of the Theogony’s account 
of Eris, ‘Strife’. The first Eris is associated with war, evil, and battle, while Zeus 
placed the second in the earth to rouse all equally to work by prompting each 
man to strive against the other justly. The outcomes of order and disorder dis-
tinguish the two Erides, with Zeus elevating the former (17-19; cf. 15-16). The 
potential conflict can thus be rephrased as follows: is there anywhere within 
Zeus’ order that the disorderly Eris nevertheless persists, that Zeus is needful? 
When we come to Hesiod’s description of the month of Lenaion, we will see 
in what sense Zeus’ order is lacking, and therewith the substance of Hesiod’s 
critique of providence.
Presently, Hesiod takes us through three myths: the already discussed Erides, 
the Prometheus and Pandora story, and the generations of man. Through these 
myths, Hesiod lays out the human condition and the possible reactions we may 
have to it. In this way, he will prepare his hymn to Zeus, where he attempts to 
remove the attraction of injustice and set his brother Perses and the gift-eating 
kings on the path of justice. Now, in accordance with his focus on providence, 
Hesiod continues his explication of the human condition with a discussion of 
why the gods have hidden the livelihood of men. He does so through a recapitu-
lation of the Pandora and Prometheus stories. The Theogony treated the human 
condition only insofar as it proved necessary to its attempt to show that Zeus 
was, contrary to his predecessors, the sort of god that addresses the human 
condition, the god of human piety. Now that he is concerned with the actual-
ization of Zeus’ rule, Hesiod drops all talk of the splitting of the ox, and focuses 
instead on Prometheus’ theft of fire and Zeus’ consequent punishment of 
the gift of woman, now named Pandora. In the Theogony, the beautiful evil 
of woman consisted in the beautiful promise of overcoming one’s mortality 
and the evil of being deprived of one’s livelihood, such that the sole means of 
preserving one’s livelihood after death, reproduction, was also an obstacle to 
its accumulation while alive. In the Works and Days, Hesiod elaborates on the 
250 Priou
polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 31 (2014) 233-260
Theogony’s account30 by explaining that the beautiful evil released all the evils 
that plague man – the evils on earth, in the sea, and sicknesses – while keep-
ing within itself Elpis, ‘Hope’. Elpis can be attractive only in a world filled with 
evils. By grouping Elpis with all the world’s evils, Hesiod suggests that she is 
just another evil. Nietzsche offers a similar interpretation, that Elpis is ‘in truth 
the most evil of evils, since she prolongs the torment of men’ (Human, All-Too-
Human I, no. 71). Yet Hesiod seems to understand Elpis in a somewhat more 
insidious way than as a deterrent from suicide. Whereas the other evils impede 
our attempt to live and to gather our livelihood by spreading throughout the 
world, Elpis remains inside woman. That is, woman promises release from 
the other evils by containing within her the hope of persisting after death by 
means of reproduction.31 Elpis thus appeals not just to the desire to avoid evil, 
but also to the desire to be immortal. Zeus’ high deception therefore consists 
in appropriating the desire that would destroy the initial distinction between 
gods and men decided in Mekone (Theogony 535-6).32 The taking of the ox’s 
edible parts and the theft of fire constitute two attempts to raise the human 
closer to the divine, and thus two attempts to alleviate man of his deplorable 
condition and render Zeus’ rule irrelevant. Elpis deters man from suicide by 
promising a more beautiful escape from death: becoming a god. Zeus uses the 
self-forgetting of ἔρως (cf. Theogony 120-2) to put man to rest, and thus give 
him, who would otherwise always endeavour to upset the order of things, a 
fixed place in the cosmos. Zeus usurps the desire to usurp Zeus.
In the immediate sequel, Hesiod promises to explain ‘how gods and mortal 
men came to be from the same’ (108). The sense of ὁμόθεν is unclear, and is 
presumably borne out by what follows, Hesiod’s enumeration of the five gen-
erations of man. The final two are familiar: the demigods from the Catalogue 
of Women and the age of iron from the present age. Hesiod felt no reason 
to discuss the prior three until now, though they extend back to the age of 
Kronos. The first two generations are pre-Zeus, while the latter three are 
fathered by Zeus. Of all the generations, the first, golden one seems most of 
30 In 83, Hesiod repeats the formula δόλον αἰπὺν ἀμήχανον from Theogony 589, while in 105 
he echoes the lesson of Theogony 613, thus emphasizing the continuity between the two 
passages, while expanding on the content of the prior passage.
31 An empty jar of clay that contains only hope, but has the face of an immortal goddess 
is a fitting image for woman’s potential for pregnancy and our expectation that through 
reproduction we will obtain some measure of immortality. Consider, in contrast, Vernant’s 
interpretation of woman as a fiery γαστήρ and Elpis as an ‘ambiguous expectation both 
fearful and hopeful about an uncertain future’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, pp. 62-8, 77-8, 81, 
85-6).
32 Cf. Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos, p. 101; Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, p. 226 n. 19.
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all to approximate the sort of bliss men of the iron age would wish for, a life 
free of the pains of work and death. They are free of death because it over-
comes them just like sleep; theirs is a bliss born of ignorance. How they remain 
unaware of death, so that it not bring them any pain, is puzzling, especially 
since others of their kind must die around them. In contrast, the silver genera-
tion approximates the golden generation’s bliss through a century of nursing 
in their mothers’ arms. Upon reaching manhood, however, their folly gives rise 
to woes, as their arrogance leads them, first, to destroy one another almost 
immediately and, second, not to attend to their sacrifices to the gods. The 
golden generation exaggerates the desires of mortals in order to demonstrate 
the impossibility of mortal bliss, since it would require ignorance of death, 
while the silver exaggerates the period of infancy to show the brutality and 
impiety of a man suddenly robbed of this blissful ignorance. Both the first 
two generations seem indifferent to the gods, the golden because they have 
no need of them, the silver because of the support of their mothers.33 They 
pre-date Zeus’ political rule because they represent the polar ends of the quest 
for livelihood: the private nursing of a child and the non-political bliss of com-
plete self-sufficiency. Just as the respective rules of Ouranos and Kronos had 
some initial correspondence to, but ultimately did not make adequate sense 
of, the human condition, so too must Hesiod’s portrait of the human condition 
make adequate sense of man’s mortality. The gods and mortal men are ‘from 
the same’ for they must both fit the human condition as it is now:34 a provi-
dential god indifferent to man’s desires makes as little sense as a mortal man 
unaware of death.
The three generations of Zeus that follow depart from the two pre-Zeus gen-
erations by depicting man in his political setting, and thus closer to man as he is 
now. The bronze generation borrows from the silver its violent arrogance (134, 
146: ὕβρις) and approximates the gold and silver inasmuch as they apparently 
need not labour in the fields to survive, if they ate at all. Characterized as so 
strong as to be unbending, their violence ends up destroying one another. They 
embody the bellicosity of the following generation of demigods, but without 
their justice. They thus go to Hades nameless or lacking renown (154: νώνυμοι). 
The race of demigods is the only race whose names we learn, ones already 
familiar from the Catalogue of Women. Because they are ‘just and therefore 
better’35 than the bronze generation, they don’t go nameless to Hades, but to 
33 Cf. Benardete, ‘First Crisis’, pp. 12-13.
34 The human being as he is now would thus be the subject of both poems.
35 On the phrase δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον in 158, see Verdenius, A Commentary on Hesiod Works 
and Days, p. 99; West, Hesiod: Works and Days, p. 190.
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the isles of the blessed, eating the honey-sweet (μελιηδέα) crops, and so earning 
what seems like the much sought-after drone life (cf. 303-6, Theogony 590-602). 
The generation of heroes is rewarded with what the bronze generation had 
no use for. The generation of heroes seems, therefore, to be what the genera-
tion of bronze would look like, if they had needed to eat daily or to labour for 
their food, and thus had a constant reminder of their mortality. Justice can 
only temper a warlike man if he is aware of his mortality. The present genera-
tion of iron, however, is so burdened with evils and woes that they tend away 
from the justice, through which the generation of heroes earned their place 
on the isles of the blessed, and toward the accelerated old age and impiety 
of the generation of silver. The four generations thus act as a reminder against 
the impossible reactions to death each represents: blissful ignorance (gold), 
violent anger upon loss of that bliss (silver), brutal indifference (bronze), 
and striving for fame and recognition from the gods (demigods) collectively 
point to the life of justice that increases one’s livelihood so as to bequeath it 
to one’s offspring (iron, present). The preceding three stories – the dual Erides, 
Pandora, and the generations of man – coalesce in the age of iron, wherein the 
ubiquity of evils forces us to choose which Eris to follow and thereby whether 
we tend toward the blessedly just heroes of the prior generation or toward the 
childlike fools of the silver generation (131: νήπιος; cf. 40, 286, 397, 633, as well 
as 218, 456). Accordingly, in order to dissuade his audience from following the 
Eris that ‘rejoices in evil’, Hesiod will have to demonstrate that justice is in fact 
better, a task that will require convincing both the ‘gift-eating kings’ and their 
subjects, Perses included, that they are fools for not accepting such initially 
backwards sounding propositions as ‘half is more than all’ and ‘there is great 
benefit in mallow and asphodel’ (40-1).36
7 Hesiod’s Twin Exhortations (Works and Days 202-341)
Hesiod continues with two exhortations: he exhorts his audience first to jus-
tice (202-85) and only after that to work (286-341), so that the former limits 
the latter. If one expects to find in the exhortation to justice a demonstration 
of its goodness, disappointment awaits, since much, though not all, of it reads 
as preaching to the choir. But such is to be expected, for the fool Perses, hav-
ing attempted to make his gain through the evil Eris (27-41), comes now to 
Hesiod in need (396-8). ‘Having suffered, a fool knows (ἔγνω)’ (218; cf. 89). Yet 
36 Cf. 694.
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Hesiod performs the exhortation to justice through a dialogue, in which he 
addresses the kings and Perses back and forth, convincing each in turn that 
justice is more choiceworthy than injustice. Hesiod begins with the kings (202-
12), then switches to Perses (213-47), goes back to the kings again (248-74), and 
ends finally back with Perses (274-85). The form of his exhortation implies that 
only when one party is convinced of certain points will the other be convinced 
of other points, and back again, through to the end of the demonstration. The 
proof that justice is more choiceworthy than injustice is no less communal 
than justice itself. Whether this proof amounts to a demonstration that justice 
is good will become clear only after Hesiod tests the providence of Zeus, dis-
cussed in the following section. Presently, however, Hesiod’s reconciliation of 
the kings with Perses, and those like him, will bring to the fore Hesiod’s ‘sweet 
song’, and thus raise the question, on which Hesiod touches only briefly, of the 
sort of knowledge he must have in order to sing as he does.
Hesiod begins by addressing the kings with the famous parable of the hawk 
and the nightingale. Gripping the nightingale in his claws, the hawk reproaches 
his captive for crying out in song even though a stronger one has him and can, 
accordingly, do what he wishes with his prey. ‘Mindless is he who wishes to 
carry on against the stronger’ (210). The parable seems only to embolden the 
kings. But it is not for this reason a failure, for it articulates beautifully to 
the corrupted kings their implicit justification for their actions. Hesiod uses the 
song to puff up the chests of the kings. The parable thus discounts the power 
of song in speech while raising it in deed. Having encouraged the kings, Hesiod 
turns to his brother and begins to preach to the choir. With his brother facing 
the choice between justice and arrogance, he paints a picture of what the city 
would look like when governed by each. In the just city, men follow justice 
and avoid ruin and hunger by obtaining their livelihood from the life-giving 
(ζείδωρος) crops of the earth (232, 237). In the arrogant city, even one evil man 
can be the cause of destruction, leading Zeus to make the women barren and 
to diminish the homes of its inhabitants. Hesiod’s account thus directs Perses 
not only to act justly, but to demand the same of his city’s fellow-inhabitants, 
including the corrupt and newly emboldened kings with whom Perses has pre-
viously had dealings. Hesiod’s parable to the kings has only made the necessity 
of correcting them all the more apparent. Turning back to the kings, Hesiod 
warns them that Justice sings (γηρύετ[ο]; cf. Theogony 28) to Zeus, who in turn 
punishes the people (δῆμος) for the kings’ wickedness. Perses cannot help but 
hear in this a call to punish, or at least straighten out, the corrupt kings, and the 
kings a warning of how much stronger the δῆμος is than them and of Hesiod’s 
ability to awaken that strength with his song – an ability the kings must now 
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realize the singer just exercised on them.37 The kings thus learn that justice 
is choiceworthy at least inasmuch as the δῆμος proves stronger than them.38 
Hesiod then ends the exhortation to justice by turning back to Perses and tell-
ing him to keep justice in mind,
for the Kronian ordained (διέταξε) this law (νόμον) for human beings,
while for fish and beasts and the winged birds,
to eat one another – since there is no justice with them,
but to human beings he gave justice. (276-9)
This closing statement on Zeus’ νόμος corrects for the kings their beastly self-
understanding.39 Addressed to Perses and those who share in his experience, 
however, it is a succinct statement of their piety and the constraints it places 
on human action. More fundamentally, this statement shows how Zeus’ law 
answers the cosmic demands the human will makes. Where man is unable to 
provide for himself from the earth with the fiery arts, he turns to burn inedible 
bones for assistance from the gods to fulfil his will.40 Zeus’ response is a νόμος 
that warns men against acting like beasts and rewards them for acting justly. 
The beasts have no νόμος. We must keep this point in mind when we examine 
37 Benardete argues that ἀποτείσῃ δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων should be translated as ‘the 
people pay back the kings’ wickedness’ in Benardete, ‘Hesiod’s Works and Days: A First 
Reading’, in Benardete (author) and R. Burger and M. Davis (eds.), The Archaeology of the 
Soul (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2012), pp. 7-24, p. 15 n. 16. Hesiod may, however, 
intend both senses, for each makes sense in the context of the drama. Hearing this phrase, 
Perses might understand Hesiod to say that he will be punished for the wickedness of 
the kings, while the kings might understand it to mean that the people will punish them 
for their wickedness. Exploiting the self-concern of each, Hesiod would be using the 
ambiguous phrase to instill anger in the δῆμος and fear in the kings, thus facilitating 
the communal proof of justice.
38 Hesiod will not address the kings again. ‘The prayer with which the poem opened (9) is 
assumed fulfilled’ (Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos, p. 41). It seems, then, that Hesiod would also no 
longer have any need for Zeus.
39 I owe the observation that this passage corrects the earlier parable, and thus resolves the 
problem indicated by West, Hesiod: Works and Days, pp. 204-5, to Prof. Jane Carter.
40 The burning of bones thus develops into a pious act from an act of frustration that the 
fiery arts cannot make sustenance of them. Vernant points out that ‘sacrifice . . . takes 
on a mediating role between gods and men. It serves as an intermediary between the 
two races. But if sacrifice makes communication between them possible, it is by means 
of an allocation that sets them against each other. It unites them, not so they may be 
rejoined . . . but to confirm the necessary distance between them’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s 
Table’, p. 35).
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the actualization of Zeus’ rule in the everyday life of a man like Perses, in our 
discussion of 342-764.
As regards Perses, his reward’s full weight is felt in the final line of the 
exhortation to justice, where a man’s keeping his oath is said to increase his 
race after him. Hesiod’s song has pinned the blame for Perses’ plight on the 
rampant injustice of him and his fellow citizens, with whose purging Hesiod 
claims ‘the city flourishes and the people within blossom’ (227). Such seems 
to be the communal proof that justice is more choiceworthy than injustice. 
His song thus shares with Zeus’ deception the promise of some measure of 
immortality, by assuring man that the cosmos will bear out Zeus’ law, the 
guarantee of his providence. Hesiod’s ‘pleasant singing’ holds law and cosmos 
together through the beautiful promise that justice will not only preserve a 
man’s life, but enlarge his livelihood and his race (cf. 235). Because the exhor-
tation to work asks Perses to withhold from the apparently easy-going road 
of evils and to embrace the sweat and toil the gods have placed as obstacles 
on the path to virtue, Hesiod must state that promise with exceptional force, 
as he immediately does. Having warned his brother of the difficulty of the 
path to virtue, Hesiod urges him always to remember what he commands. He 
justifies this by telling him that, while he is best who is mindful of all things 
(πάντα νοήσει), the one who obeys or is persuaded by (πίθηται) this man when 
he speaks is better than him who neither is mindful of them for himself nor 
listens to another. Hesiod believes himself to be among those who are mindful 
of all things, presumably because he is the recipient of the Muses’ song. Yet 
even he concedes that it is vexing for mortal men to be mindful (νοῆσαι) of the 
ever-altering mind (νόος) of Zeus (483-4). Evidently, ‘all things’ does not mean 
the same thing for Hesiod as it does for Zeus. Precisely what Perses and men of 
his kind are to learn is not immediately clear, nor is it of immediate concern to 
Hesiod. Having warned his brother of the difficulty of the task and reminded 
him of the necessity of obeying him, Hesiod again paints a twofold picture of 
Perses’ choices, the life of work and the workless life. Zeus rewards the man 
who lives the life of work not just by warding off hunger, but with abundant 
livelihood and wealth. The road he takes thus leads to the promised virtue 
and renown that accompany wealth and make the workless man jealous. But 
when the workless man turns not to work the earth, but rather to unjust works 
(ἔργων . . . ἀδίκων), Zeus dims the man and diminishes his home. In both parts 
of his picture, Hesiod uses the fear of death and the desire for immortality to 
motivate Perses, who may either die anonymous or live up to his divine ances-
try (299: δῖον γένος). Closing with a reminder to burn shining thigh bones to 
Zeus, Hesiod invokes the humble piety that girds the rustic virtue of the farmer, 
while reminding us of the parallel passage in the Theogony and, thereby, of the 
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vast, cosmic demands the human will makes of the god that would lay claim 
to satisfying that piety. Having secured the basis of this piety in his brother, 
Hesiod turns to articulate how he ought to live and so whether Zeus can meet 
those demands. Consequently, Hesiod will disclose what he means when he 
claims that he, Hesiod, is mindful of all things.
8 Providence (Works and Days 342-764)
Hesiod opens and closes his detailed instructions to Perses with sets of advice. 
The first is more closely bound to the exhortations to justice and work inas-
much as they focus on his treatment of others, namely how to deal with one’s 
neighbours, the importance of gift-giving, general comments on how to gather 
and consume one’s livelihood, and how to choose a wife and start one’s family.41 
The second picks up where the first left off, namely as regards family matters, 
but soon transitions into the prohibitions of piety. In this section, then, Hesiod 
seems to effect in full the transition in his brother to the humble piety that gov-
erns the farmer’s life. Accordingly, in this passage we expect Hesiod to accom-
plish what he hoped to do at the outset of the Works and Days, to relate what 
is to his brother (10: ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην); we would thus also expect here, in 
what appears to be the most mundane of topics, to find an answer to our initial 
and more exalted question, of whether the Muses speak many lies like what 
are (ἐτύμοισιν), or whether they sing true things (Theogony 26-8); and, lastly, we 
hope thereby to find out in precisely what sense Hesiod claims ‘to be mindful 
of all things’.
How the instructions might bolster Perses’ piety is apparent from a cursory 
reading. Apart from the vivid, detailed instructions of how to do certain works, 
Hesiod provides the cosmic cues that will tell his brother when to do them: the 
position of the stars and constellations, the coming and going of solstices and 
equinoxes, and the behaviour of the birds and other animals. Although detailed, 
the instructions are not exhaustive (cf. 456-7).42 Yet they are nonetheless some 
41 Hesiod initially, and with some frequency, interrupts his specific instructions to Perses 
with echoes of his earlier exhortations (cf. 394-404, 408-13, 453-7).
42 This is only to nuance, and not to oppose, Vernant’s interpretation, according to which 
‘cereal food is eaten at the culmination of a regulated relation to the gods. The food 
creates a pious mode of communication between mortals and Immortals . . . For Hesiod 
the cultivation of wheat constitutes a truly cultic act that the peasant must perform for 
the divine powers. In his eyes work is a daily devotion; each task is assiduously executed 
at the proper moment out of respect for such sanctified acts’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, 
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indication that man’s works fit neatly within the cosmos, his tasks changing 
with the seasons and the earth responding in kind. And where disorder lurks, 
there Hesiod waits with advice, say, should one’s plow-stem break or should 
one not know what sort of oxen to buy or man to hire to drive them. Zeus’ rule 
does, therefore, seem to reconcile motion and rest in the everyday life of the 
farmer, keeping the evil Eris at bay by rewarding just work. The order appears to 
break down, however, when one learns how little things, like an under-fed dog, 
can allow a thief to ransack one’s goods, but large things, like forgetting to plow 
on time, can be of no difference. The latter leads Hesiod, in the middle of his 
advice for him who plows late, to remark that the vacillation of Zeus’ mind or 
intention (νόος) makes it hard for mortal men to discern (νοῆσαι). Yet this does 
not undermine the guarantee of Zeus’ providence, since his plans needn’t be 
comprehensible to man: counsellor or mindful Zeus (μητίετα) gives man, the 
mere belly, his law, and demands obedience to that law without knowledge of 
his intention. Nevertheless, Hesiod does give some indication that Zeus cannot 
fulfil this guarantee. His instructions soon turn to Lenaion, the sole month that 
he separates out by name. By marking off this month, he draws our attention 
to the poem’s final passage, in which Hesiod details which days Zeus has deter-
mined to be good or bad for different tasks (cf. 822). Hesiod challenges us to see 
whether, during Lenaion’s bad days (κάκ᾽ ἤματα), any day is good for anything, 
and thus whether Zeus makes good on his providence during this month in 
particular. Furthermore, Boreas, mentioned in the Theogony twice – to note his 
birth and that he is one of the good winds apart from the bad ones born upon 
Typhoeus’ death (Theogony 379, 869-70) – is mentioned in the Works and Days 
only during the month of Lenaion, and always negatively (506, 518, 547, 553; cf. 
fr. 204.124-6). Subtly but surely, Hesiod gives some indication that despite the 
apparently ironclad assertion of Zeus’ providence, there are still grounds for 
doubt about the comprehensiveness of his rule, and that these grounds are to 
be found in his description of Lenaion.
After a brief introduction to Lenaion, Hesiod describes how it affects beasts 
and men, only afterwards giving his advice. The description’s emphasis on 
beasts recalls the parable of the hawk and the nightingale and the subsequent 
articulation of Zeus’ νόμος or ‘law’. Hesiod devotes a sizeable portion of the 
description to ‘the boneless one’ (ἀνόστεος), i.e. the octopus, who is forced to 
eat his own foot to survive, for the sun displays no νομός or ‘pasture’, off which 
p. 36). That is, because Hesiod’s instructions are selective we must additionally consider 
why he emphasizes only certain tasks from among all these cultic acts.
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he might feed.43 Were it not for Zeus’ νόμος, through which he inclines man 
away from injustice and toward just work and the consequent accumulation 
of livelihood, man, too, would lack a νομός and have no better a fate than the 
octopus (cf. 497). ‘For this month’s most difficult, winter – difficult for cattle 
and difficult for human beings’ (557-8). The octopus, and surely many other 
beasts in addition, stands in need of νόμος no less than man. Beginning from 
the equally needy situations of men and beasts, the Bible asks God, ‘What is 
man, that thou art mindful of him?’ (Proverbs 8:4), while Hesiod appears to ask 
Zeus, ‘What is the octopus, that you aren’t mindful of him?’ The octopus truly 
is the boneless one (ἀνόστεος) in a fireless home (ἀπύρῳ οἴκῳ), for he is unable 
to propitiate a god to help him by burning white bones (ὀστέα) on his altars. 
Hesiod thus seems to imply that not only Zeus’ law, but Zeus himself is circum-
scribed to the human realm. Such is the price we pay for having dismissed the 
cosmic gods Ouranos and Kronos in the search for a god like Zeus, who claims 
to meet the demands of human piety. Zeus is cosmic in speech, but human in 
deed.44 This contradiction emerges as the inverse of the human being’s frus-
trated will: unable to master the cosmos through the fiery arts, man demands 
a god do so, a god who must answer the human condition while governing 
the cosmos as a whole. As the premise of justice, Zeus is necessary to prevent 
human beings from destroying one another. Wherever there is justice, we find 
Zeus, and in this way he is like what is (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖον). But because his provi-
dence is contradictory, he is ultimately the lie of which the Muses sing.
Hesiod thus intimates that Zeus is necessary for us to make the best of a bad 
situation. He portrays his audience similarly to the octopus when he advises 
them to cut one foot off an eight-foot axle, putting the extra foot to another use 
(cf. 424-5). His advice for winter consists largely of what animal skins and furs 
to use as clothing so that one may even venture outside. Winter reveals that 
man is by nature alone, confined within. So too, his deepest hope (cf. 518-24). 
When Hesiod claims that he is mindful of all things, then, he does not mean 
that he understands how the cosmos functions. Rather, he seems to mean that 
he possesses knowledge of the human will and the recalcitrance of the cosmos 
to the demands of that will. In this respect, Hesiod anticipates Socrates’ focus 
43 The two meanings of νομος differ in accordance with where the accent lies. Since there 
were no accents in Hesiod’s Greek, the listener would know the sense of the word from 
the rhapsode’s pronunciation, while the reader would discern the meaning from context.
44 Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, pp. 57-61 rightly interprets the ox’s stomach, filled with the 
edible parts, by which Prometheus attempts to deceive Zeus, as an image for man, but 
does not discuss how bones covered in a layer of attractive fat might be an image for the 
gods: externally beautiful, but internally unable to provide for us.
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exclusively or primarily on the human things.45 And he also shares with him 
his famous irony, for Hesiod bolsters his brother’s piety despite his implicit, 
impious claim that the cosmos lacks divine governance. Turning lastly to sail-
ing, Hesiod advises his brother against it, noting that the evil winds dominate 
the seas. Unlike during Lenaion, the distinction between good and bad winds 
holds true on the seas.46 The seas appear to confirm the cosmic rule of Zeus, for 
he has given man the earth to till and man takes to the seas only to circumvent 
his work.47 Likewise, Hesiod’s tale of his single trip abroad. Altogether, Hesiod 
provides a fitting, though ironic, lead-in to the subsequent advice, which cul-
minate in the prohibitions of piety, and the closing days of Zeus.48
9 Conclusion (Works and Days 765-828)
In the days of Zeus, one hears echoes of many of the issues Hesiod has tra-
versed, an appropriate culmination to the preceding poems. The Theogony 
gave us Zeus the god of human piety, the only god that could make sense of 
the back-and-forth of motion and rest through a static order that persists in 
spite of change. This is the Zeus who determines certain days as fitting or 
45 Cf. n. 34, above. The shift from the cosmic gods Ouranos and Kronos to the political 
god Zeus seems to presage Socrates’ turn away from natural science in Plato’s Phaedo. 
And the critique of Zeus in the Works and Days would also presage Socrates’ discovery 
of the distinction between divine and human wisdom, found in Plato’s Parmenides and 
mythologized in his Apology of Socrates. Vernant shows that Hesiod quite consciously 
avoids giving an Ionian, elemental anthropogony and so reveals his implicit understanding 
of the word ‘nature’ in the phrase ‘human nature’: ‘If Hesiod does not express man’s 
“intermediate” condition via traditional images contrasting man, made of earth and 
water, with luminous and celestial beings such as the Olympian gods, or with beings 
made of earth and fire such as the autochthones, it is because in his view man’s humanity 
does not reside either in a particular “nature” linked to the elements that form him or 
in an origin peculiar to him alone. Man’s true nature arises from the position that he 
occupies in the midst of a whole, from his status in a hierarchy of functions, prerogatives, 
and honors’ (Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, p. 48). 
46 Save during a reference to winter in 675.
47 An excellent representation of Hesiod’s understanding of the uncertainty of the sea 
and the security of land is Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s painting Storm at Sea. As the ships 
struggle in the swells, light shines only on the whales in the foreground, the birds in the 
sky, and the city in the distant background.
48 During the prohibitions, ‘the focus narrows further to the human body, now truly viewed 
as a mere belly producing waste products and defilement’ (Clay, Hesiod’s Cosmos, p. 47). 
Cf. Theogony 26.
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unfitting for this or that work, who seems to have delineated the proper con-
text for every action. The Works and Days, however, gave us Zeus the all-too-
human god, who seems absent some one-third of the days, and thus, for a large 
portion of the time, indifferent to the outcomes of our lives. Yet, as Hesiod 
informs us, men still debate which days are best for what, and the poem ends 
with us looking to the entrails of birds and taking care over the minutia of 
transgressions.49 Nevertheless, Hesiod intimates that overall human life as a 
whole is better through justice, with the final reckoning appearing to tip in 
favour of the good days over and against the bad or indifferent days. But still, 
it is difficult to tell, since some days are a mixture of good and bad. Whatever 
the case, Hesiod’s song of Zeus makes us aware of the presuppositions of our 
attachment to justice, either as that which we disregard even though we need 
it most or as that to which we are attentive but of whose true character we 
remain unaware. Hesiod does not treat the question of what we are to do, once 
we are aware of Zeus’ contradictory character, about the entanglement of our 
ends he purported to reconcile; nor does he instruct us as to how we are to put 
together the process of becoming, in which we find ourselves, with our desire 
for a static understanding of the cosmos; and he certainly says nothing as to 
where we are to direct the now undirected erotic longing Zeus’ high deceit of 
woman had occupied and how this relates to the cosmic Eros, from which he 
began. Although his psychology gives ample indication of the sort of inquiry 
of which his song has made use, nevertheless, as far as a thematic treatment is 
concerned, Hesiod seems to have left this question to the philosophers.50
49 Commenting on the closing lines of the poem, Bartlett notes that ‘within the limits of 
what can be said in the context, Hesiod reminds us of the true peak (panta eidōs), even as 
he urges Perses to defer to the entrails of birds’ in R. Bartlett, ‘An Introduction to Hesiod’s 
“Works and Days” ’, The Review of Politics, 68 (2006), pp. 177-205, p. 204.
50 Cf. Vernant, ‘At Man’s Table’, pp. 74-5.
